How did the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood win pow­er so quick­ly fol­low­ing Egyp­t’s dra­mat­ic 2011 Arab Spring upris­ing? Why did the Broth­er­hood fall from pow­er even more quick­ly, cul­mi­nat­ing with the over­throw of Egyp­t’s first elect­ed pres­i­dent, Mohamed Mor­si, in July 2013?

Eric Trager exam­ines the Broth­er­hood’s deci­sion-mak­ing through­out this crit­i­cal peri­od. Based on inter­views with dozens of Broth­er­hood lead­ers and cadres includ­ing Mor­si, Trager argues that the very orga­ni­za­tion­al char­ac­ter­is­tics that helped the Broth­er­hood win pow­er also con­tributed to its rapid down­fall. The Broth­er­hood’s inten­sive process for recruit­ing mem­bers and its rigid nation­wide chain of com­mand meant that it pos­sessed unpar­al­leled mobi­liz­ing capa­bil­i­ties for win­ning the first post-Mubarak par­lia­men­tary and pres­i­den­tial elec­tions, but its hier­ar­chi­cal orga­ni­za­tion­al cul­ture alien­at­ed many Egyp­tians, includ­ing many with­in Egyp­t’s state institutions.